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Justifications of Welfare Guarantees under
Normalized Utilities
HARIS AZIZ
It is standard in computational social choice to analyse welfare considerations under the assump-
tions of normalized utilities. In this note, we summarize some common reasons for this approach.
We then mention another justification which is ignored but has solid normative appeal. The
central concept used in the ‘new’ justification can also be used more widely as a social objective.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: I.2.11 [Distributed Artificial Intelligence]: Multiagent
Systems; J.4 [Computer Applications]: Social and Behavioral Sciences—Economics
General Terms: Theory, Algorithms, Economics
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Fair allocation, solutions Concepts, multiagent resource allo-
cation, mechanism design without money, computational social choice, approximation algorithms
1. INTRODUCTION
Social welfare under normalized utilities is frequently considered in the compu-
tational social choice literature. It is especially the case in multi-agent resource
allocation, mechanism design without money and utilitarian voting. The welfare
notions considered include utilitarian social welfare (sum of agents’ utilities), egali-
tarian social welfare (minimum of agents’ utilities) and Nash social welfare (product
of agents’ utilities). Most of the focus is on utilitarian welfare which goes back to
ideas of Bentham [1789].
For multi-agent resource allocation under ordinal preferences, researchers have
considered how well social welfare is approximated by specific mechanisms for truth-
ful preferences or preferences in equilibrium (see e.g., [Filos-Ratsikas et al., 2014,
Guo and Conitzer, 2010, Bertsimas et al., 2011]). The standard assumption in these
papers is that utilities are normalized i.e., an agent’s sum of utilities for all items
is one. The assumption has been termed as unit-sum.
Similarly, there is growing literature on implicit utilitarian voting (see e.g., [Cara-
giannis et al., 2016b, Lu and Boutilier, 2011, Boutilier et al., 2012]) where normal-
ized utilities are popular. For these settings, the distortion of a voting rule is used
as a measure of how good the rule is. Distortion is the worst ratio of the maxi-
mum utilitarian social welfare versus the utilitarian social welfare achieved among
all problem instances. Many results concerning distortion bounds hinge on the
assumption the utilities are normalized.1
In other multi-agent resource allocation problems, agents are asked to express
cardinal utilities over items but these utilities are assumed to be normalized or are
processed to be normalized. For example, Bouveret and Lemaˆıtre [2015] state that
1There is another stream of results on distortion that assume that utilities are induced by a
metric (see e.g., [Anshelevich and Postl, 2016].)
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most collective utility functions only make sense if the utilities are expressed on a
common scale or normalized. Even when agent preferences are ordinal, the scoring
rules used to get ‘proxy utilities’ satisfy the normalized or equal scale property (see
e.g., [Baumeister et al., 2014]).
In short, both within voting and resource allocation, there is a focus on welfare
under normalized utilities.2 When the ‘real’ utilities of agents are not normalized,
it begs the question that why normalized utilities are used. The papers making this
assumption either justify it as a standard assumption used in previous work or by
mentioning one or two reasons. In this note, we curate and discuss justifications
for welfare approaches under normalized utilities.
First Principle/Philosophical Justifications
(1) Scale invariance. Egalitarian and utilitarian social welfare suffer from being
responsive to scale variance.3 Imposing normalized utilities is a simple way to
regain scale invariance.
(2) Guaranteeing a proportion of the ultimate happiness of an individual.
Another way to view scale invariance is that one is concerned less about the
amount of utility achieved by an individual agent and more so about the fraction
of maximum possible utility that she achieves. This concern is indeed captured
when one tries to approximate egalitarian welfare under normalized utilities.
(3) Fairness. In voting, when each voter is allowed to spread a utility of 1 over the
alternatives, it is akin to each voter having ‘one’ vote and ‘equal’ say. Similarly,
normalized utilities are considered in resource allocation to define rules such as
Adjusted Winner [Brams and Taylor, 1996]. If utilities are not normalized,
and the rule is welfarist in some sense, then fairness can be undermined. For
example, when considering rules that are responsive to utilitarian social welfare,
the outcome is favourable to agents with the most magnified utilities. When
considering egalitarian welfare, the allocation is aligned with the concerns of
the agent with most scaled down utility valuations.
Justification in a common setting
(4) Probabilistic perspective. Another possible justification for using normal-
ized utilities is using the utility as a measure of certainty of liking an item or
outcome.
Technical Justifications
(5) Strategic. The reasons for fairness can also be seen as justification regarding
strategic issues. Considering normalized utilities circumvents certain trivial
manipulation actions of scaling up or down of utilities. When considering util-
itarian welfare normalization prevents agents from overshadowing other agents
by reporting extremely high utilities. An agent who reports the highest utilities
2The welfare notion of utilitarian social welfare under normalized utilities has been referred to as
‘relative utilitarianism’ [Dhillon and Mertens, 1999].
3Nash welfare on the other hand is scale invariant. The Spliddit website [Goldman and Procaccia,
2014] which provides a convenient interface for fair division algorithms uses a solution based on
the Nash welfare [Caragiannis et al., 2016a] for allocation of goods.
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for all items would get all the items in a utilitarian social welfare maximizing
solution!
(6) Reasonable approximation guarantees for welfare. Another reason for
considering normalized utilities is also technical and somewhat ‘self-serving’.
There is little hope of achieving reasonable approximation guarantees of maxi-
mum welfare or reasonable low distortion when utilities are unbounded. There-
fore the normalization assumption can be seen as a trick of the trade to obtain
reasonable approximation guarantees.
We have discussed reasons for considering (approximate) welfare guarantee for
normalized utilities. There are at least two possible points of criticism concern-
ing social welfare under normalized utilities. Firstly, one may negatively perceive
that the welfare guarantee results only hold under the restrictive assumption of
normalizes utilities. Secondly, there can be a more classical objection to a cardinal
approach to social welfare itself which involves interpersonal comparison of utili-
ties (see e.g., [Robbins, 1935]). The second issue may appear especially acute in the
context of social choice settings such as fair allocation and voting which typically
do not involve money. One reason for pursuing social welfare in computer science
research has been that ‘without explicit optimization objective that measures the
quality of outcomes, approximation cannot play a role’ [Procaccia and Tennenholtz,
2013].
We point out that by simply pursuing justification (6), one can paradoxically get
a justification that avoids both criticisms. One can get a similar guarantee for a
concept that does not involve interpersonal comparison of utilities and does not
require scaling of utilities of any agent. This largely ignored ‘new’ justification is
centered around a relaxation of Pareto optimality.
(7) Approximate Pareto optimality under any scaling of the utilities.
We say that utility profile u = (u1, . . . , un) Pareto dominates utility profile u
′ =
(u′1, . . . , u
′
n
) if ui ≥ u
′
i
for all agents i and ui > u
′
i
for some agent i. Given any
α ∈ [0, 1], a utility profile u is α-Pareto optimal if there exists no other achievable
utility profile u′ such that α · u′ Pareto dominates u.4 The concept is very natural
and has been used in the context of routing games [Aumann and Dombb, 2010],
probabilistic matchings [Immorlica et al., 2017] and participatory budgeting [Aziz
et al., 2017].
It can be proven that any outcome that achieves α fraction of the maximum
social welfare under normalized utilities also satisfies α-Pareto optimality under
any scaling of the utilities. Suppose agents have normalized utilities. Consider
any outcome that achieves α fraction of the maximum social welfare. Suppose the
utility profile of the agents is u. Then we first claim that u is α-Pareto optimal.
Suppose it is not α-Pareto optimal. Then there exists another achievable utility
profile u′ such that α · u′ Pareto dominates u. But this means that u achieves less
than α fraction of social welfare of u′ which is a contradiction. We have established
that the outcome achieves α-Pareto optimality under normalized utilities. We note
that α-Pareto optimality is invariant under scaling of an agent’s utility function
4The definition is written for positive utilities but can be adapted for negative or mixed utilities.
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even when discrete outcomes are considered. The reason is that for an agent i, any
two utility functions ui and u
′
i
where u′
i
= αui and for any social outcomes a, b,
ui(a) ≥ ui(b) if and only if u
′
i
(a) ≥ u′
i
(b). Hence, the outcome achieves α-Pareto
optimality under any scaling of the agents’ utilities.
By normalizing the utilities and achieving or establishing some bound on the
maximum utilitarian or egalitarian social welfare also implies the same approxi-
mation bound on Pareto optimality for the ‘real’ utilities of the agents. Thus one
can use justification (6) for technical ease but then achieve a guarantee that has
more wide-spread normative appeal. The ‘new’ justification can also be used as
another motivation for the projects of implicit utilitarian voting and approximate
mechanism design without money. It can also be viewed as a source of corollaries
for these lines of work. Taking another view, for new settings, one can directly use
approximate Pareto optimality rather than particular social welfare as the social
objective. A lower bound result for approximate Pareto optimality would imply a
similar lower bound for utilitarian welfare.
We conclude by mentioning that the normative/axiomatic approach in traditional
social choice and the quantitive welfarist approaches employed in recent computa-
tional social choice papers have been termed as distinct from each other. The use
of approximate Pareto optimality provides a convenient bridge between the two
approaches.
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